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Jan Woleński, Andrzej Waleszczyński, Michał Obidziński, Julia Rejewska, Adrian Mróz, Elena Lisanyuk, Evelina Barbashina, Andrew Schumann,


Truth and Adequacy.
Remarks on Petrażycki’s Methodology

The Author: Jan Woleński,
The paper discusses the concept of adequacy central for Pertażycki’s methodology.
According to Petrażycki any valuable scientific theory should be adequate,
that is, neither limping (to broad with respect its actual scope) nor jumping
(too narrow with respect to its actual scope). Consequently, adequacy of a
theory is a stronger condition than its truth. Every adequacy theory is true, but
not conversely. However, there is problem, because scientific laws are conditionals
(implications). This suggests that adequacy is too strong conditions, because
the consequence of an implication has a wider scope than its antecedent.
Thus, laws should have the form of equivalence. The paper shows how modeltheoretic
characterization of theories allows to recognize truth and adequacy,
consistently with Petrażycki’s claims.

The Knobe Effect From the Perspective of Normative Orders

The characteristic asymmetry in the attribution of intentionality in causing side
effects, known as the Knobe effect, is considered to be a stable model of
human cognition. This article looks at whether the way of thinking and
analysing one scenario may affect the other and whether the mutual
relationship between the ways in which both scenarios are analysed may affect
the stability of the Knobe effect. The theoretical analyses and empirical studies
performed are based on a distinction between moral and non-moral normativity
possibly affecting the judgments passed in both scenarios. Therefore, an
essential role in judgments about the intentionality of causing a side effect
could be played by normative competences responsible for distinguishing
between normative orders.

The Emotivism of Law.
Systematic Irrationality, Imagined Orders,
and the Spirit of Decision Making

The Author: Adrian Mróz,
The process of decision making is predictable and irrational according to
Daniel Ariely and other economic behaviorists, historians, and philosophers
such as Daniel Kahneman or Yuval Noah Harari. Decisions made anteriorly
can be, but don’t have to be, present in the actions of a person. Stories and
shared belief in myths, especially those that arise from a system of human
norms and values and are based on a belief in a “supernatural” order (religion)
are important. Because of this, mass cooperation amongst strangers is possible.

Leon Petrażycki on Norms and Their Logical Study

In this paper we discuss L. Petrażycki’s idea of norm as a normative relation
and show its repercussions in two perspectives connected to each other, in the
legal theory in the framework of which it was originally introduced and where
its role was straightforward, and in logic where it played a shadowy role of a
fresh idea which in his expectation would have been the core of the novel
logical theories capable of modelling reasoning in law and morals. We pay
attention to the scholarly environment in which Petrażycki has proposed those
ideas and to the

Creative Reasoning and Content-Genetic Logic

The Author: Andrew Schumann,
In decision making quite often we face permanently changeable and potentially infinite databases when we cannot apply conventional algorithms for choosing a solution. A decision process on infinite databases (e.g. on a database containing a contradiction) is called troubleshooting. A decision on these databases is call d creative reasoning. One of the first heuristic semi-logical means for creative decision making were proposed in the theory of inventive problem solving (TIPS) by Genrich Altshuller. In this paper, I show that his approach corresponds to the so-called content-generic logic established by Soviet philosophers as an alternative to mathematical logic. The main assumption of con tent-genetic logic is that we cannot reduce our thinking to a mathematical combination of signs or to a language as such an d our thought is ever cyclic and reflexive so that it contains ever a history.