

The Traditional Approach to the Periodization of Indian Philosophy as a Hegelian Approach

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Abstract:

This paper is devoted to the methodology of history of philosophy. There are considered two approaches: the Hegelian and Schellingian ones. It is shown that the Hegelian approach has many weak points. Both approaches are demonstrated on the material of Indian philosophy. The Schellingian approach was hammered out then by Foucault as archeology of philosophy.

Keywords: historic time, prehistoric time, Hegel, Schelling, Foucault, Indian philosophy.

1. Introduction

There are two extreme approaches to the study of the history of philosophy authored by: (i) Diogenes Laërtius (ca. 3rd century A.D.) who wrote the book *Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers* (Βίαι καὶ γνῶμαι τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ εὐδοκμησάντων; *Vitae Philosophorum*) and (ii) Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) who is an author of the following three books on this subject: *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* (1837), *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion* (1832), and *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* (1833–1836). The first approach is focused on differences among philosophers and their concepts. The second approach accepts some general features and joint viewpoints in philosophies to reconstruct a joint history of philosophy of all nations as a linear development.

The methodology for the history of philosophy reflected by Hegel is based on two principles, used by many philosophy historians so far: (1) the philosophical idea is considered given only as the history of this idea (each philosophical system has a genealogy and does not arise without the influence of previous systems, on the one hand, and competing systems, on the other hand); (2) the philosophical idea develops from its abstract forms to more concrete ones (after development, the philosophical system becomes more complex, and there is an increase in its philosophical reflection).

Hence, according to Hegel, each philosophical idea is defined by its genealogy in the retrospective view or by its history in the perspective view. In Hegel's terminology, each idea is a development and transition from the state *an sich* (in itself) to the state *für sich* (for itself) and it can be revealed only genealogically from the end of the transition process or historically from the beginning of the transition process.

For example, Brahman from the *Upaniṣads* as the supreme existence and absolute reality was regarded by Hegel as "a supreme being, but one that merely thinks itself, or is merely at home with itself, outside which all other content and configuration still lies" [6, p. 331]. In this feature, He is close to "the God of Judaism". Both are "an abstraction, God in the spirit but not yet God as spirit" (*Ibid.*). As a consequence, Brahman of the *Upaniṣads* as well as the God of Judaism is the God *an sich* (in Himself), i.e., He is just a beginning in the theological reflections, where Jesus Christ should become the God *für sich* (for Himself) as the end of theological reflections.

Hegel claims that the movement of the human spirit, including any philosophical reflection, has proceeded from the east to the west. It means that philosophy begins in the east and ends in the west. To the same extent, there were only three principles in religion proceeding from east to west: (i) the God in Himself as He is presented in the world of Far Eastern religions (Mongolian, Chinese, Indian); (ii) the God out of Himself as He is presented in the Islamic world; (iii) the God for Himself as He is presented in the Christian world:

For if we cast our eyes around the world, we can discern three main principles in the older continents: the Far East (i.e., Mongolian, Chinese, or Indian) principle, which is also the first to appear in history; the Mohammedan world, in which the principle of the abstract spirit, of monotheism, is already present, although it is coupled with unrestrained arbitrariness; and the Christian, Western European world, in which the highest principle of all, the spirit's recognition of itself and its own profundity, is realised. This universal series has been described here as existing perennially; but in world history we encounter it as a sequence of successive stages [7, pp. 128–129].

Now, only Christian peoples play a significant role in the world history:

The whole eastern part of Asia is remote from the current of world history and plays no part in it; the same applies to the north of Europe [7, p. 172].

In this paper, some strict limits in the Hegelian approach to the history of philosophy are shown. So, I am going to discuss that the deep problem of the approach founded by Hegel is that all the substantial differences among cultures and philosophies of different times and geographic locations are ignored so that a reconstructed philosophical tradition is examined as hermetic and self-sufficient – as a linear development from *an sich* to *für sich*. In Section 2, the traditional periodization of Indian philosophy is examined as made in accordance with the Hegelian approach and there its main problems are shown. In Section 3, I consider the criticism of the Hegelian approach proposed by Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775–1854).

2. Periods of the Indian Philosophy According to the Hegelian Approach

A good illustration of applying Hegel's methodology can be presented by the following periodization of the Indian philosophy. This periodization is intended to reflect the linear development of Indian thought, starting from the period of the compilation of the Vedas: (H1) the four Vedas (*vedaḥ*): *R̥gveda*, *Yajurveda*, *Sāmaveda*, and *Atharvaveda*, and the Vedic period as such (developing an abstract ideal

picture of the world through organizing a complex religious ritual with reciting hymns); (H2) *Brāhmaṇas*, *Āraṇyakas*, and *Upaniṣads* – the first proto-philosophical books comprehending H1 (the birth of Indian proto-philosophy as a beginning of reflection carried out by the Brahmins in respect to the Vedic texts as well as Vedic rituals); (H3) *Sūtras* belonging to Āstika (classical schools) – the first philosophical books in the strict sense as treating the texts of H2 (creating *ṣaḍdarśana* or six philosophical schools of Āstika: Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta); (H4) *Sūtras* belonging to Nāstika (non-classical schools, first of all, Buddhism and Jainism).

We see a linear development from H1 and through H2 to H3, and then H4 appears as a critical reevaluation of previous periods. It is a step-by-step revelation of Vedic thought from its state *an sich* (H1) to its state *für sich* (H3) and then it comes to its negation (H4). This periodization was well formulated by Friedrich Max Müller (1823–1900), one of the founders of Indology, see [10]: (1) *Khanda* period, earlier than 1000 B.C. – composing hymns of the Vedas and forming the Vedic religion; (2) *Mantra* period, from 1000 to 800 B.C. – collecting hymns into the four Vedas; (3) *Brāhmaṇa* period, from 800 to 600 B.C. – composing the texts of *Brāhmaṇas*, *Āraṇyakas*, and *Upaniṣads*; (4) *Sūtra* period, since 500 B.C. – first of all, the *Śulbasūtra* (considering the fire-altar construction) and the text of Pāṇini about the Sanskrit grammar – the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*.

Müller pays attention that the same periods are repeated as appropriate classes in the traditional study of *Ṛgveda*:

A student of a Rig-Veda-sākhâ (a recension of the Rig-Veda), if sharp and assiduous, takes about eight years to learn the Dasagranthas, the ten books, which consist of (1) The *Samhitâ*, or the hymns. (2) The *Brāhmaṇa*, the prose treatise on sacrifices, etc. (3) The *Āraṇyaka*, the forest-book. (4) The *Grihya-sūtras*, the rules on domestic ceremonies. (5–10) The six *Angas*, treatises on *Sikshâ*, pronunciation, *Gryotisha*, astronomy, *Kalpa*, ceremonial, *Vyākaraṇa*, grammar, *Nighantu* and *Nirukta*, etymology, *Khandas*, metre [10, p. 161].

In the meanwhile, Müller understands that Buddhism is out of this scheme and explains this fact based on archaeological data. According to these data, there were the Northern conquerors of India from the 1st century B.C. to the 4th century A.D. who were not believers in the Vedas, but they follow Buddhism with some own religious traditions such as Mazdeism and other Iranian worships. These conquerors were Indo-Scythians (Sanskrit: *Śaka*), i.e., they are one of the Iranian-speaking tribes from Tūrān (the region of today's Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and the north-eastern parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan):

The Northern conquerors, whatever their religion may have been, were certainly not believers in the Veda. They seem to have made a kind of compromise with Buddhism, and it is probably due to that compromise, or to an amalgamation of Saka legends with Buddhist doctrines, that we owe the so-called Mahāyāna form of Buddhism – and more particularly the Amitābha worship – which was finally settled at the Council under Kanishka, one of the Turanian rulers of India in the first century A.D.

If then we divide the whole of Sanskrit literature into these two periods, the one anterior to the great Turanian invasion, the other posterior to it, we may call the literature of the former period *ancient* and *natural*, that of the latter *modern* and *artificial*.

Of the former period we possess, *first*, what has been called the *Veda*, i.e., Knowledge, in the widest sense of the word – a considerable mass of literature, yet evidently a wreck only, saved out of a general deluge; *secondly*, the works collected in the Buddhist Tripitaka, now known to us chiefly in what is called the Pāli dialect, the Gāthā dialects, and Sanskrit, and probably much added to in later times [9].

Thus, according to Müller, H4 differs from H1, H2, and H3 due to some external influences of the Śakas (Indo-Scythians) on the Indo-Aryans. Without their invasion of North India up to some central parts, we would have a pure hermetic philosophical tradition from H1 and through H2 to H3, but after their invasion, Mahāyāna as a part of H4 appeared.

The periodization close to Müller on the basis of the Hegelian approach was also proposed by Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1888–1975), the Indian philosopher [13, pp. 57–59]: (1) the Vedic period (1500 B.C.–600 B.C.) which covers the spread of the Aryan culture in India and “it was the time which witnessed the rise of the forest universities, where were evolved the beginnings of the sublime idealism of India” [13, p. 57]; (2) the epic period (600 B.C.–200 A.D.) – developing the early *Upaniṣads* and the *śaḍdarśanas*, composing the two Indian great epics: the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*, forming and expanding Buddhism, Jainism, Śaivism, Vaiṣṇavism; (3) the *sūtra* period (from 200 A.D.) – founding philosophy in the narrow sense in India; (4) the scholastic period (from 200 A.D.) – founding the tradition of philosophical commentaries.

Müller and other indologists have continued the Hegelian approach to the periodization of Indian philosophy as a hermetic and self-sufficient tradition. For instance, Erich Frauwallner (1898–1974) proposed the following general periodization:

First, the continuation of the Vedic thought-world and the beginning of the *Vedānta* up to the time of the system built by Śaṅkara. Secondly, the systems built by the Śaivas. Thirdly, the decline of Buddhism and the rise of the Tantric Schools. Fourthly, the *Vedānta* system of the *Vaiṣṇava* and the other *Viṣṇuistic* Schools. Finally, is dealt the continuance still of the systems of the older period, so far as they continue in this period. A sub-division of the period of the modern Indian Philosophy renders itself to be unnecessary as it embraces only an entirely small compass of time. Thus, is given an organization of Indian Philosophy which, in my view, largely docs justice to the course of historical development and also simultaneously summarizes in clarity the phenomena belonging together, in well-arranged groups [5].

Nevertheless, there is a great deal of textual evidence which refutes this insularity of Vedic tradition from H1 to H3 assumed in advance. First, many of the earliest philosophical *sūtras* of Āstika contain quotations from Madhyamaka and Yogācāra – two early schools of Mahāyāna from North India. So, the *Gauḍapādīyakārikā*, on the one hand, represents the earliest available record of an uncompromising non-dualistic doctrine (*advaita-vāda*) – the central and principal concept of Vedānta school, and, on the other hand, shows that its author(s) had a good knowledge of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra texts [8]. The *Nyāyasūtra*, the basic logical treatise of Āstika, also contains some direct quotations from Madhyamaka and Yogācāra books and was written surely after the Buddhist logical treatise *Milindapañha* [17].

The Pāli Canon was composed from the 1st century A.D. to the 4th century A.D. It is one of the earliest hermetic corpus of Indian texts with effective dating due to some inscriptions and cross-cultural textual analysis. It is quite surprising that many times there are mentioned not the four Vedas, as it can be expected, but only three Vedas (*Rk*, *Yajur*, and *Sāma*), for instance:

*tena kho pana samayena brāhmaṇassa pokkharasātissa ambaṭṭho nāma māṇavo antevāsī
hoti ajjhāyako mantadharo tiṇṇaṃ vedānaṃ pāragū sanighaṇḍukeṭubhānaṃ
sākkharappabhedānaṃ itihāsapañcamānaṃ padako veyyākaraṇo
lokāyatamahāpurisalakkhaṇesu (Ambaṭṭhasutta 1, 3); [14, p. 88].*

At that time Pokkharasāti had a student named Ambaṭṭha. He was one who recited and knew the hymns (*manta*) by heart, and was an expert in the **three Vedas** (*tiṇṇaṃ vedānaṃ pāragū*), together with their vocabularies (*nighaṇḍa*), ritual (*keṭubha*), phonology (*akkhara*) and etymology (*pabheda*), and the stories (*itihāsa*) as fifth. He knew philology (*pada*) and grammar (*veyyākaraṇa*) and was well versed in cosmology (*lokāyata*) and the [32] marks of a great man (*mahāpurisa*).

Why three? It is possible to explain by that the *Atharvaveda* was not a canonical book at least in the 1st century A.D. Another critical point in respect to the assumption of linear development from H1 to H3 is that at the time of Buddha and his disciples for a few hundred years early Sanskrit or Vedic was associated only to the Vedas and was not popular as a language of philosophy or other literature:

tena kho pana samayena yameḷakekuṭā nāma bhikkhū dve bhātikā honti brāhmaṇajātikā kalyāṇavācā kalyāṇavākkaraṇā. te yena bhagavā tenupasaṅkamimṣu, upasaṅkamtivā bhagavantaṃ abhivādetvā ekamantaṃ nisīdimṣu. ekamantaṃ nisinnā kho te bhikkhū bhagavantaṃ etadavocum—“etarahi, bhante, bhikkhū nānānāmā nānāgottā nānājaccā nānākulā pabbajitā. te sakāya niruttīyā buddhavacanaṃ dūsentī. handa mayaṃ, bhante, buddhavacanaṃ chandaso āropemā”ti. vīgaraḥi buddho bhagavā ... pe ... kathaṅhi nāma tumhe, moghapurisā, evaṃ vakkhatha — “handa mayaṃ, bhante, buddhavacanaṃ chandaso āropemā”ti. netam, moghapurisā, appasannānaṃ vā pasādāya ... pe ... vīgarahitvā ... pe ... dhammiṃ kathaṃ katvā bhikkhū āmantesī — “na, bhikkhave, buddhavacanaṃ chandaso āropetabbaṃ. yo āropeyya, āpatti dukkaṭassa. anujānāmi, bhikkhave, sakāya niruttīyā buddhavacanaṃ pariyaṇitun” ti (Khuddakavattthukkhanda, Cūḷavagga 5, 33); [12, p. 139].

At that time, Yameḷa and Kekuṭa were the names of two monks who were brothers, *brāhmaṇas* (Brahmins) by birth, with beautiful voices, with excellent enunciation. They went to the Lord; and after arrival they greeted the Lord and sat down at a respectful distance. As they were sitting down at a respectful distance, these monks spoke the following to the Lord: “Recently, Lord, monks of various names (*nāma*), various clans (*gotta*; Sanskrit: *gotra*), various births (*jacca*; Sanskrit: *jāti*) have gone forth from various families (*kula*); these corrupt the words of the Buddha in his own dialect (*sakāya niruttīyā*). Now we, Lord, transform the words of the Buddha into the metrical form (*chandaso āropemā*) [of Vedic].” The Buddha, the Lord rebuked them, saying:

“How can you, foolish men, speak thus: ‘Now we, Lord, give the speech of the Buddha in the metrical form (*chandaso āropemā*) [of Vedic]’? It is not, foolish men, for pleasing those who are not pleased ...” And after rebuking them, he gave a reasoned talk – he talked to the monks the following words:

“Monks, the speech of the Buddha should not be given in the metrical form (*chandaso āropemā*) [of Vedic]. Whoever should give it, there is an offence of wrong-doing. I allow you, monks, to learn the speech of the Buddha according to his own dialect (*sakāya niruttīyā*).”

The hypothesis that the expression *chandaso āropemā* means early Sanskrit or Vedic was put forward by Thomas William Rhys Davids (1843–1922), see his translation (1899–1921): (i) as the antithesis to “his own dialect”; (ii) because of using the word *chandasi* in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini with the meaning “the Veda-dialect”; (iii) since this change of sermon language was proposed by “Brahmins by birth”; (iv) within the traditional commentaries to this verse by Theravada scholars – so, Buddhaghosa (5th

century A.D.) comments: *chandaso āropemā ti vedam viya sakkata-bhāsāya vācanā-maggaṃ āropema*, where *sakkata* means *saṃskṛta*.

In the Pāli Canon, we do not find quotations from the Indian epics, only some references to epics as an especial genre (*itihāsa*). Furthermore, we do not find some contexts of phrases showing that their authors knew the Vedas or *Upaniṣads*. The critique against the notion of *ātman* (the idea of non-self; Pāli: *anattā*; Sanskrit: *anātman*) is an attempt to develop a Buddhist type of reflection on all the cognitive and emotional states to distinguish them from ourselves. Initially, *ātman* (*attā*) is a singular reflective pronoun for all three persons and all three genders in Sanskrit (Pāli). The Buddha criticizes different idols of the mind and using the pronoun *ātman* is regarded by him as a sign of uncriticism in general. Hence, *anātman* (*anattā*) in the Pāli Canon is not directly connected to a critique against the *ātman* from the *Upaniṣads*. It is a Buddhist critique against non-reflection and nothing more.

Nevertheless, in the Mahāyāna *sūtras* we can find some ideas of *ātman* which are close to the *Upaniṣads*. For instance, in the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* (大般涅槃經; *Dàbān nihuán jīng*, T. 12, No. 376), the first Chinese translation of which appeared in 417 A.D., it is maintained that every separate mental state (*dharma*) [切法; *qiè fǎ*], according to its nature [其性; *qí xìng*], does not have itself (*anātman*) [無我; *wú wǒ*]. But it does not mean that the *ātman* does not exist. It is *dé* (*puṇya*) [我者是德; *wǒ zhě shì dé*] and it is obtaining mastery (*vaśitā*) [我者自在; *wǒ zhě zìzài*]. Thus, the *ātman* is the Mahāyāna path as such:

切眾生承如來言展轉相教皆說無我，此是如來知時方便濟眾生故，說一切法其性無我，非如世間所受吾我，故說一切法其性無我。時復說我，如彼良醫明乳藥法，當知我者是實，我者常住非變易法非磨滅法，我者是德，我者自在，如善乳藥醫，如來亦然為諸眾生說真實法，一切四眾當如是學

qiè zhòngshēng chéng rúlái yán zhǎnzhuǎn xiāng jiào jiē shuō wú wǒ, cǐ shì rúlái zhī shí fāngbiàn jì zhòngshēng gù, shuō yīqiè fǎ qí xìng wú wǒ, fēi rúshìjiān suǒ shòu wú wǒ, gù shuō yīqiè fǎ qí xìng wú wǒ. shí fù shuō wǒ, rú bǐ liáng yī míng rǔ yào fǎ, dāng zhī wǒ zhě shì shí, wǒ zhě chángzhù fēi biànyì fǎ fēi mómiè fǎ, wǒ zhě shì dé, wǒ zhě zìzài, rú shàn rǔ yào yī, rúlái yì rán wèi zhū zhòngshēng shuō zhēnshí fǎ, yīqiè sì zhòng dāng rú shì xué (Taishō Tripiṭaka 1988, T. 12, No. 376, 0863a09–0863a16)

All sentient beings who inherit the Tathāgata's words, change their cognitions and all say that there is no *ātman*. This is because the Tathāgata knows that it is convenient for all living beings. It is said that the nature of all *dharma*s has no ego [*ātman*], and it is not the same as the world accepts itself [*ātman*]. This is as in the case of the great doctor who well understands the *dharma* [*fǎ*] for the milk medicine, you should know that the *ātman* is true [*shí*], the *ātman* is permanent [*chángzhù*], it is a non-changeable [*fēi biànyì fǎ*] and non-erasing *dharma* [*fēi mómiè fǎ*]. The *ātman* is virtue [*dé*, *puṇya*], the *ātman* is obtaining mastery [*zìzài*, *vaśitā*], like a good milk medicine doctor, and the Tathāgata is also the same who teaches all sentient beings about the true *dharma*, and all the four groups should learn it like this.

Hence, instead of a linear development of the Buddhist teaching from a Brahminical context to a more independent doctrine we encounter some Brahminical ideas such as the concept of *ātman* not in early Buddhist texts, but, on the contrary, only in later ones, i.e., dated from the 2nd century A.D. This is explained by the fact that Buddhism and Brahmanism developed in parallel for some time. This fact is

well confirmed archaeologically, too. For example, refuting the linear development of the Vedic thought from H1 to H3 is confirmed by the fact that the earliest Sanskrit inscriptions are dated strongly from the 1st century B.C. to the 1st century A.D., not earlier [15]. And for a long time, we can observe a smooth change from Prakrits such as Gāndhārī into pure Sanskrit through some hybrid forms from the 2nd century A.D. to the beginning of the 5th century A.D. Only since the 4th–5th century A.D. there have been many long phrases in pure Sanskrit, although the earliest Prakrit inscriptions are dated to the 4th century B.C.

It is worth noting that the earliest Vaiṣṇava inscriptions are dated to the early 2nd to the late 1st century B.C., while all the early Śaiva objects and inscriptions are found exclusively at Buddhist sites for a long time within a syncretic Buddhist-Śaiva culture and only since the early 5th century A.D. Śaivism has been completely emancipated from Buddhism [18].

Thus, the Hegelian approach to historically consider each philosophy as a linear development from the state *an sich* to the state *für sich* is not validated by the textual analysis and there is no archaeological evidence at least on the example of Indian philosophy. We face a mixture of various concurrent movements presenting H2, H3, and H4 until about the 2nd–4th centuries A.D., when the philosophical discourse in India had been finally formed.

The dating of the life of the Buddha is a decisive moment for the dating of the post-Vedic period (i.e., the period after H1). And there are two approaches to this: long and short chronology. According to the long chronology, Śākyamuni Buddha lived from ca. 566 to ca. 486 B.C. (i.e., Buddha's *parinirvāṇa* dates to 218 years before Aśoka's coronation). According to the short chronology, he lived from ca. 448 to ca. 368 B.C. (i.e., Buddha's *parinirvāṇa* dates to 100 years before Aśoka's first regnal year).

The short chronology was substantiated by Heinz Bechert [1], [2] who showed, based on the references to *Dīpavaṃsa* 1.24–26 and 5.55–59, that the long chronology of 218 years was a later development [2, p. 104 ff.]; [1, pp. 329–343]. The short chronology is acknowledged by the following quotation from a 1st century A.D. Kharosthī manuscript (British Library fragment 4.6 recto): Aśoka was “a century after the Blessed Buddha achieved *parinirvāṇa* (*vasaśada pariṇurvude budhe bhagavade*)” [11, p. 68].

According to the Gilgit manuscript of the *Bhaiṣajyavastu* [3] written in Sanskrit and dated to the 8th century A.D., the short chronology may be even much shorter, namely Buddha's *parinirvāṇa* goes back to 400 years before the Kanīṣka *stūpa* (erected ca. 130 A.D.). It indicates the years of Śākyamuni's life from ca. 350 to ca. 270 B.C.:

*bhagavān kharjūrikām neuropath | khajūrikāyāṃ bāladārakān pāṃsustūpakaiḥ krīḍato
'drākṣīt* | bhagavān bāladārakān pāṃsustūpakaiḥ krīḍato dṛṣtvā ca punar vajrapāṇiṃ
yakṣam āmantrayate | paśyasi tvaṃ vajrapāṇe bāladārakān pāṃsustūpakaiḥ krīḍataḥ |
evaṃ bhadanta | eṣa caturvarṣaśataparinirvṛtasya mama vajrapāṇe kuśanavaṃśyaḥ
kanīṣko nāma rājā bhaviṣyati | so 'smiṃ pradeśe stūpaṃ pratiṣṭhāpayati | tasya
kanīṣkastūpa itī saṃjñā bhaviṣyati | mayi ca parinirvṛte buddhakāryaṃ kariṣyati
(Mūlasarvāstivādavinaya 1: 2–3); [3].*

Bhagavān [Buddha] reached Kharjūrikā where he saw boys playing with a heap of earth. Seeing the boys playing with the mud heaps, he then turned to the *yakṣa* Vajrapāṇi, “Do you see, Vajrapāṇi, how the boys are playing with the mud heaps?” “Yes, sir”. “Four hundred years after I have completely liberated, Vajrapāṇi, there will be a king named Kanīṣka of the Kuśāṇa lineage. He shall set up a *stūpa* on this very spot, and it shall be called the Kanīṣka *stūpa*. Since I have been completely ceased, it will be he who will carry out the duty of the Buddha.

Evidently that the shorter the chronology is, the better we may explain various facts of the non-linear development from H2 to H4. The point is that in the short post-Vedic period until the 2nd–4th centuries C.E., Brahminical and Buddhist stages of development really coexisted. Furthermore, the shortest chronology with the dating from ca. 350 to ca. 270 B.C. agrees well with the facts of the beginning of the *śramaṇa* movement from ca. 400 A.D. in the context of the first large growth of Indo-Aryan urbanization in the Ganges Valley at that time.

3. Schelling versus Hegel

An alternative methodology for the history of philosophy was proposed by Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775–1854) in his late works such as *die Philosophie der Offenbarung* (Vorlesung; 1841–1842) and *die Philosophie der Mythologie* (Vorlesung; 1842). He was the first who grounded that the historic time (*die geschichtliche Zeit*) as a history of philosophical idea from *an sich* to *für sich* is just an official imagined history, i.e., it is a history within the current dominance of our certain ideology. To reveal the true genealogy of the given idea, we need to turn to its prehistoric time (*die vorgeschichtliche Zeit*) – we must refute the official ideology, where this idea is presented now within a linear imagined or made-up history of *geschichtliche Zeit*. It means we should go beyond a unified hermeneutics for one corpus of studied texts. Thus, the “Hegelian” periods from H1 to H4 correspond to the existed (*Śaiva* as well as *Vaiṣṇava*) traditions of today’s Hinduism, for example, to the classes of studying the *R̥gveda* [10, p. 161] mentioned above as corresponding to the periods from H1 to H3.

Schelling maintains that *die vorgeschichtliche Zeit* means to be before the historic process as such (to be *vorhistorische*) at the stage, where our consciousness did not yet reconstruct a linear development in the meaning of Hegel. At this stage we can observe religions and mythological ideas in their pure forms, i.e., without our imaginations and one-sided (historic) interpretations:

Der wahre Inhalt der vorgeschichtlichen Zeit ist die Entstehung der formell und materiell verschiedenen Götterlehren, also der Mythologie überhaupt, welche in der geschichtlichen Zeit schon ein Fertiges und Vorhandenes, also geschichtlich ein Vergangenes ist [16, p. 588].

The true content of prehistoric time is presented by the emergence of formally and materially different doctrines of gods, therefore, [by the emergence] of mythology in general, which is already given as something finished and available in the historic time, therefore, as something past historically.

Hence, according to Schelling, historic and prehistoric times are two different approaches to the history of philosophy and our thinking as such:

Demgemäß sind die geschichtliche und die vorgeschichtliche Zeit nicht mehr bloß relative Unterschiede einer und derselben Zeit, sie sind zwei wesentlich verschiedene und voneinander abgesetzte, sich gegenseitig ausschließende, aber eben darum auch begrenzende Zeiten. Denn es ist zwischen beiden der wesentliche Unterschied, daß in der vorgeschichtlichen das Bewußtsein der Menschheit einer innern Notwendigkeit, einem Prozeß unterworfen ist, der sie der äußeren wirklichen Welt gleichsam entrückt, während jedes Volk, das durch innere Entscheidung zum Volk geworden, durch dieselbe Krisis auch aus dem Prozeß als solchem gesetzt und frei von ihm nun jener Folge von Taten und Handlungen sich überläßt, deren mehr äußerer, weltlicher und profaner Charakter sie zu historischen macht [16, pp. 588–589].

Accordingly, historic and prehistoric times are no longer merely relative differences of one and the same time; they are two essentially different and separated, mutually exclusive, but just, therefore, also limiting times. So, there is an essential difference between the two so that in the prehistoric one the consciousness of humanity is subject to an inner necessity, to a process which, as it were, removes it [time] from the external real world, while every people, which has become a people through an internal decision, is also composed of the process as such through the same crisis, and free from it, it is now left to this sequence of deeds and actions for which a more external, worldly and profane character makes it [time] historical.

In line with the Schellingian idea of prehistoric time, Paul-Michel Foucault (1926–1984) views genealogy in a new way (not Hegelian) – as a necessary method of philosophical analysis, in which we should get out of the isolation of one hermeneutic tradition with a one-sided historical reconstruction – in other words, we must abandon the Hegelian principle of ascent from the abstract to the concrete, while preserving the idea of the historicity of philosophical knowledge. According to Foucault, each cultural or social phenomenon can be philosophically investigated through a genealogical reconstruction of epistemic frameworks. To this end, he began to distinguish between the epistemological level of knowledge, representing what is now, and the genealogical reconstruction of existences. He called the genealogical reconstruction “the archaeological level of knowledge” or “the archaeology of knowledge.” According to Foucault, philosophy also has its archaeology. It is one of the core objectives of philosophy:

(...) archaeology, addressing itself to the general space of knowledge, to its configurations, and to the mode of being of the things that appear in it, defines systems of simultaneity, as well as the series of mutations necessary and sufficient to circumscribe the threshold of a new positivity [4, p. xxv].

As we see, the archaeology of philosophy in the sense of Foucault should replace the history of philosophy in the sense of Hegel, if we would like to consider philosophical texts outside of only one closed philosophical tradition. The periodization of Indian philosophy from H1 to H4 reflects only one philosophical tradition with one hermeneutics – the Hindu philosophy of existing *Śaiva* as well as *Vaiṣṇava* religious traditions.

Within the framework of Foucault's approach, structuralist methods of text analysis are used. These methods are easily enhanced by the methodology of other humanities dealing with the history of knowledge: (a) historical reconstruction based on both archaeological data and other methods of studying material culture (description, interpretation, cataloging); (b) reconstruction presented in historical sociology, which studies societies in their historical dynamics; (c) methods of comparative textology and hermeneutics, which study different corpora of texts of the same or different traditions.

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