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Hans Van Eyghen

Hans Van Eyghen studied theology and philosophy at the Catholic University of Louvain. He is currently a phd-candidate at VU Amsterdam.



Religious Belief is Not Natural. Why Cognitive Science of Religion Does Not Show That Religious Belief is Trustworthy

Issue: 5:4 (The twentieth issue)
It is widely acknowledged that the new emerging discipline cognitive science of religion has a bearing on how to think about the epistemic status of religious beliefs. Both defenders and opponents of the rationality of religious belief have used cognitive theories of religion to argue for their point. This paper will look at the defender-side of the debate. I will discuss an often used argument in favor of the trustworthiness of religious beliefs, stating that cognitive science of religion shows that religious beliefs are natural and natural beliefs ought to be trusted in the absence of counterevidence. This argument received its most influential defense from Justin Barrett in a number of papers, some in collaboration with Kelly James Clark. I will discuss their version of the argument and argue that it fails because the natural beliefs discovered by cognitive scientists of religion are not the religious beliefs of the major world religions. A survey of the evidence from cognitive science of religion will show that cognitive science does show that other beliefs come natural and that these can thus be deemed trustworthy in the absence of counterevidence. These beliefs are teleological beliefs, afterlife beliefs and animistic theistic beliefs.

Book Review “Religion Explained? The Cognitive Science of Religion after Twenty-Five Years”

Issue: 6:4 (The twenty fourth issue)
I review the book “Religion Explained? The Cognitive Science of Religion after Twenty-Five Years.” I discuss all the papers in the book and highlight some recurrent issues.

Are Design Beliefs Safe?

Issue: 8:1 (The twenty nineth issue)
Recently, Del Ratzsch proposed a new version of the design argument. He
argues that belief in a designer is often formed non-inferentially, much like
perceptual beliefs, rather than formed by explicit reasoning. Ratzsch traces his
argument back to Thomas Reid (1710-1796) who argues that beliefs formed in
this way are also justified. In this paper, I investigate whether design beliefs
that are formed in this way can be regarded as knowledge. For this purpose, I
look closer to recent scientific study of how design beliefs are formed. I argue
that the science strongly suggest that people easily form false beliefs. As a
result, design beliefs can only constitute knowledge if subjects have additional
reasons or evidence for design.